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Footnotes
1. Interestingly, one judge has cautioned against “the error of stereo-
typical thinking that sexual assault complainants are always
truthful.” See R. v. Dufresne, 2017 YKTC 45 (Can.).
2. Justice Camp subsequently resigned.
3. The Canadian Judicial Council is a federal body created under the
Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c J-1. (Can.). It deals with complaints
made against federally appointed judges (i.e., Supreme Court
judges). Each province has a provincial judicial council, which
deals with complaints against provincial court judges.
4. CAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY PURSUANT TO
S. 63(1) OF THE JUDGES ACT REGARDING THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
ROBIN CAMP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE INQUIRY COM-
MITTEE TO THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2016) [hereinafter the
Inquiry Report]. The inquiry report can be found at www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca (search for “Inquiry Report).
5. [2014] CarswellAlta 2756 (Can. Alta.). 
There has been a great deal of controversy lately in Canadaover trial judges purportedly resorting to stereotypicalreasoning in assessing the credibility of witnesses, partic-
ularly complainants in sexual assault trials.1
This issue came to a head with a recommendation by the
Canadian Judicial Council to the Minister of Justice that a trial
judge be removed from office based upon his conduct (i.e.,
comments during a sexual assault trial).2 The recommendation
arose out of a complaint had been made to the Canadian Judi-
cial Council concerning former Justice Robin Camp.3 The
Council’s inquiry committee concluded that Justice Camp
“relied on discredited myths and stereotypes about women and
victim-blaming during the Trial and in his Reasons for Judg-
ment” (at paragraph 6).4
In this column, I intend to review the decision of the Judi-
cial Council in relation to former Justice Camp. I then intend
to review how allegations of improper stereotypical thinking
have been dealt with by various Canadian appeal courts and,
in one case, the Supreme Court of Canada. 
THE COMPLAINT
The Camp complaint arose as a result of a sexual assault
trial conducted by Judge Camp in R. v. Wagar.5
In Wagar, the accused was charged with the offence of sex-
ual assault. The complainant, A.B., testified that she was sexu-
ally assaulted by the accused in the bathroom of an acquain-
tance’s apartment during a party. The accused testified that A.B.
consented to the sexual activity.
Justice Camp acquitted the accused. On appeal, the acquit-
tal was overturned (see 2015 ABCA 327). The Alberta Court of
Appeal indicated that it was “persuaded that sexual stereotypes
and stereotypical myths, which have long since been discred-
ited, may have found their way into the trial judge’s judgment”
(at paragraph 4).
During the course of the trial, Justice Camp made com-
ments and asked questions, which formed the subject matter
of the subsequent complaint.
For instance, during the submissions of counsel, Justice
Camp suggested that “young woman want to have sex, partic-
ularly if they’re drunk” (see paragraph 92 of the Inquiry
Report). In addition, during the examination of the com-
plainant, Justice Camp asked the complainant several ques-
tions (at paragraph 137 of the Inquiry Report):
Q. But when—when he was using—when he was trying
to insert his penis, your bottom was down in the
basin. Or am I wrong?
A. My—my vagina was not in the bowl of the basin when
he was having intercourse with me.
Q. All right. Which then leads me to the question: Why
not—why didn’t you just sink your bottom into the
basin so he couldn’t penetrate you?
A. I was drunk.
Q. And when your ankles were held together by your
jeans, your skinny jeans, why couldn’t you just keep
your knees together?
A. (NO VERBAL RESPONSE)
Q. You’re shaking your head.
A. I don’t know.
Finally, in his reasons for acquitting, Justice Camp made the
following comments to the accused (at paragraph 224 of the
Inquiry Report):
And I don’t expect you to concentrate the whole time,
but I want you to listen very carefully to what I’m saying
right at the beginning. The law and the way that people
approach sexual activity has changed in the last 30 years.
I want you to tell your friends, your male friends, that
they have to be far more gentle with women. They have
to be far more patient. And they have to be very careful.
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6. CAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY PURSUANT TO
S. 63(1) OF THE JUDGES ACT REGARDING THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
ROBIN CAMP, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, para. 24 (2017).
7. In R. v. Achuil, 2017 ABPC 292 (Can.), it was indicated that in
“assessing credibility, generalized stereotypical thinking must be
avoided regardless of the nature of the witness” (at paragraph 19).
The Court suggested that “there are a number of such myths in
sexual assault cases which have been reviewed in numerous cases.
The myths in summary form are as follows:
1. The Court may not draw an inference with respect to a com-
plainant’s credibility based on perceptions as to how a com-
plainant should react to a sexual assault.  
2. No adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant
may be drawn that is based on a lack of evidence of physical
injury or struggle.
3. No adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant
may be drawn that is based on the post offence demeanour or
behaviour of the complainant. 
4. No adverse inference against the credibility of the com-
plainant may be drawn that is solely based upon evidence of
questionable moral character such as the consumption of
alcohol, controlled drugs, or other behaviour infringing on
‘moral character.’”
8. This issue arose in a rather peculiar fashion in the case of R. v.
Dowholis, 2016 ONCA 801, (Can.). In Downholis, the accused
was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual assault. The
offences involved the accused participating in homosexual sexual
encounters. One of the jurors appeared on a radio show both dur-
ing and after the trial. The juror made a number of homophobic
comments during the radio shows. In setting aside the convic-
tions, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the juror’s con-
duct created the impression of an unfair trial (at paragraphs 44
and 45 ):
The likelihood that a bias against gay men would affect
the juror’s decision-making process is greater given his will-
ingness to publicly disregard instructions, engage in homo-
phobic rhetoric, and mock the court process. The issue is
not whether the juror meant what he said. Nor is it whether
he was in fact unfair. The issue is the impression that his
conduct created.
The impression created by the juror’s conduct goes beyond a bias
against gay men. A reasonable observer would have the impression
that the juror lacked respect for the justice system. This goes
directly to the perception of fairness.
To protect themselves, they have to be very careful.
The Canadian Judicial Council convened a committee to
consider the complaint and make recommendations. 
THE INQUIRY REPORT
In recommending Justice Camp’s removal from the bench,
the Inquiry Committee suggested that Justice Camp’s com-
ments during the trial were designed to “promote discredited
sexist stereotypes” (at paragraph 276). The Inquiry Committee
indicated that “Judges are not viewed simply as participants in
the justice system. They are expected to be leaders of its ethos
and exemplars of its values” (at paragraph 289). 
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
The Judicial Council accepted the Inquiry Committee’s rec-
ommendation for removal. The Council indicated that “[t]he
Judge’s misconduct was manifestly serious and reflected a sus-
tained pattern of beliefs of a particularly deplorable kind,
regardless of whether he was conscious of it or not.”6
The Council concluded that only the Judge’s removal from
office would restore the public’s confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system (at paragraph 47):
In our view, the statements made by Justice Camp
during the trial and in his decision, the values implicit in
those statements and the way in which he conducted
himself are so antithetical to the contemporary values of
our judicial system with respect to the manner in which
complainants in sexual assault cases should be treated
that, in our view, confidence in the system cannot be
maintained unless the system disassociates itself from
the image which the Judge, by his statements and
approach, represents in the mind of a reasonable mem-
ber of the public. In this case, that can only be accom-
plished by his removal from
the system which, if he were
not removed, he would con-
tinue to represent.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The issue of stereotypical
reasoning by judges has been an
issue in Canada for a significant
period of time. In R. v. D.D.,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 (Can.), for
instance, the Supreme Court
indicated that there is “no invi-
olable rule on how people who
are the victims of trauma like a
sexual assault will behave” (at paragraph 65). In R. v. C.A.M.,
2017 MBCA 70 (Can.), the Manitoba Court of Appeal sug-
gested that “[o]ne of the unfortunate realities of the Canadian
criminal justice system historically is the prevalence of the use
by lawyers, judges and juries of myths and stereotyping to dis-
credit female and child witnesses” (at paragraph 48).7
Over the last couple of years and early this year, a number
of appeals have arisen in Canada based upon the argument that
the trial judge’s decision in a particular case was the result of
improper stereotypical thinking. Though this has primarily
involved complainants in sexual assault trials, as will be seen
it can also apply to accessing the credibility of an accused per-
son. In this column, I intend to review a number of decisions
which might be of assistance in helping judges to avoid this
mistake.8
APPELLATE CONSIDERATION
In the first decision, the trial judge made the mistake of
assuming that victims of childhood sexual abuse should
demonstrate behaviours consistent with that abuse.












In R. v. A.R.D., 2017 ABCA
237 (Can.), the accused was
charged with the offence of
sexual assault. The com-
plainant testified that “over a
number of years, when she
was between the ages of 11
and 16, the respondent
touched her sexually numer-
ous times.” The trial judge
entered an acquittal. He indi-
cated that he had a reasonable doubt based upon the com-
plainant’s evidence. In acquitting the accused, the trial judge
placed significant emphasis on the complainant’s failure to
avoid the accused after the alleged assault: 
[G]iven the length of time that these events occurred
over, and the fact that the most serious event occurred
months before [the complainant] complained, I would
have expected some evidence of avoidance either con-
scious or unconscious . . . [a]s a matter of logic and com-
mon sense, one would expect that a victim of sexual
abuse would demonstrate behaviours consistent with
that abuse or at least some change of behaviour such as
avoiding the perpetrator . . . [w]hile I recognize that
everyone does not react in the same way, the evidence
suggests that despite these alleged events, the relation-
ship between the accused and the complainant was an
otherwise normal parent/child relationship . . . [t]hat
incongruity is significant enough to leave me in doubt
about these allegations.
The Crown appealed from the entering of the acquittal. The
Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that the “appeal raises one
issue”: 
[D]id the trial judge err by relying on an impermissi-
ble stereotype, or myth, about the behaviour of sexual
assault victims in assessing the complainant’s credibility
and ultimately acquitting the accused? Specifically, that
“one would expect that a victim of sexual abuse would
demonstrate behaviours consistent with that abuse or at
least some change in behaviour such as avoiding the per-
petrator.” 
A majority of the Court of Appeal answered this question
succinctly: “The answer is clear: he did.” 
The Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that “judges must be
hypervigilant against the incursion of stereotypical analyses or
assumptions into their judicial reasoning” because “specula-
tive myths, stereotypes, and generalized assumptions about
sexual assault victims . . . have too often in the past hindered
the search for truth” (at paragraphs 49, 60). The majority of
the Court of Appeal suggested that an “accused’s right to make
full answer and defence and the criminal standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, do not allow reliance on prejudi-
cial generalizations about sexual assault victims; this is of para-
mount importance when adjudicating matters involving child
complainants” (at paragraph 6).
A majority of the Court of Appeal also held that (at para-
graph 43):
The most serious problem with the trial judge’s com-
parison-based assessment of the complainant’s credibil-
ity stems from his impermissible reliance on a myth or
stereotype (masquerading as logic and common sense)
about how a sexual assault complainant, in general and
in this case, is assumed or expected to behave post-sex-
ual assault(s). Put plainly, the trial judge’s reliance on his
own “logic and common-sense” about how humans
react following sexual assault, is itself highly question-
able as to relevance and reliability. But it becomes partic-
ularly dangerous when reliance on that “logic” over-
shadows any resort to or assessment of the actual evi-
dence at trial. The trial judge found reasonable doubt
because this particular complainant did not exhibit
expected predictive, avoidant behaviour. In our view, it is
neither logical nor a matter of common sense to expect
a child complainant to behave in any particular manner. 
A majority of the Court of Appeal concluded as follows (at
paragraphs 70 to 73):
The search for avoidant behaviour or a change of
behaviour in a sexual assault complainant, particularly a
child, is in its essence nothing more than a search for
confirmatory evidence, without which a complainant
becomes less worthy of belief. The problem with such a
search is that there is no reliable support for the pre-
sumption that a sexual assault victim will invariably,
more often than not, or even to a statistically meaningful
degree, display any predictable behaviours following the
abuse. Indeed, the converse may well be true: that a vast
proportion of child sexual abuse victims are asympto-
matic in the post-victimization period both before and
after disclosure.
An accused’s constitutionally-protected right to make
full answer and defence does not permit reliance on prej-
udicial generalizations about sexual assault victims. Rea-
sonable doubt is not a shield against appellate review if
that doubt is informed by inferences based on external,
personal assumptions or expectations about how sexual
assault victims behave either generally, or specifically.
Appellate courts must carefully scrutinize reasons to
ensure that findings said to be based on “common sense
or logic” are reliably just that, and are not, in fact, unfair
and inaccurate external viewpoints that find no founda-
tion in the record. 
For all of these reasons, the Crown has established an
error of law that is directly tied to the acquittals in this
matter. We are satisfied that the crucial credibility assess-
ment of the complainant’s testimony was not solely
based on an assessment of the evidence; instead, it was
directly affected by an impermissible stereotype, or
myth, that had a material bearing on the acquittals.
For these reasons, we allow the appeal, and direct a
new trial.
6 Court Review - Volume 54 
“…it is neither 
logical nor a matter
of common sense
to expect a child
[sexual assault]
complainant to
behave in any 
particular manner.”
Court Review - Volume 54 7
THE DISSENT
In a dissenting judgment, Mr. Justice Slatter fond no stereo-
typical thinking (at paragraph 108):
In conclusion, the reasons for judgment must be read
as a whole and in context. Determining if there is a rea-
sonable doubt based on the evidence or absence of evi-
dence is the particular mandate of the trial judge. Trial
judges are entitled to rely on logic and common sense, so
long as inferences are not based on stereotypical think-
ing. This trial judge self-instructed on the need to avoid
prohibited lines of analysis. Assuming this record
engages a question of law, the Crown has not shown that
the trial judge made the asserted error, and the appeal
should be dismissed.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In
a brief oral argument (see 2018 SCC 6), the Supreme Court,
in dismissing the appeal, concluded that the trial judge had
erred in relying on the “expected behavior of the stereotypical
victim”:
In considering the lack of evidence of the com-
plainant’s avoidance of the appellant, the trial judge
committed the very error he had earlier in his reasons
instructed himself against: he judged the complainant’s
credibility based solely on the correspondence between
her behaviour and the expected behaviour of the stereo-
typical victim of sexual assault. This constituted an error
of law. 
The next decision illustrates the danger of accepting sub-
missions of counsel based upon myths and stereotypes.  
R. v. C.A.M. 
In C.A.M., the accused was convicted of the offence of sex-
ual assault. On appeal, the accused argued that the trial judge
erred in assessing the complainant’s evidence. The accused
argued that (at paragraph 45):
[T]he Complainant’s actions encouraging the
[Accused] to remain in the residence with her and phys-
ically comforting him after he had, as she described, vio-
lently sexually assaulted her multiple times and threat-
ened her with a knife, was not at all considered in the
analysis of the Complainant’s credibility and the plausi-
bility of her version of events. Further her continued
contact with the [Accused] in the days and months that
followed and his continued time spent alone with the
children, was not considered by the Learned Trial Judge
as a factor to consider when assessing the version of
events set forth by the Complainant. It is respectfully
submitted that a close critical look at the Complainant’s
evidence, as was applied to the [Accused’s], would have
caused these factors to be of significant concern on the
issue of credibility.  
The Manitoba Court of Appeal rejected this submission.
The Court of Appeal indicated, at paragraph 46, that the “strat-
egy of using myths and stereo-
types to discredit the credibility of
a complainant in an allegation of
sexual violence is ‘invidious’
because such a submission is sub-
tlety persuasive by its appeal to
common sense.”  
The Court of Appeal noted that
the “law is now well settled that
the use of myths and stereotypes
has no place in the determination
of credibility because such reason-
ing corrupts and distorts the trial process and may result in an
unfair trial” (at paragraph 50). The Court of Appeal also indi-
cated that (at paragraph 51):
[T]rial judges have a heavy responsibility to ensure
that counsel do not introduce the spectre of such forbid-
den reasoning into a trial. If that occurs in a jury trial, it
should be answered by a timely and appropriate instruc-
tion to the jury (see R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 at paras
1, 159-61). In judge-alone trials, judges must not suc-
cumb to drinking from such a poisoned chalice in their
assessment of credibility.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the accused’s submis-
sion was “unsound” (at paragraph 52 and 53):
The accused’s submission that the complainant’s cred-
ibility as to her version of events was undermined
because it did not conform to some “idealized standard
of conduct” (R v CMG, 2016 ABQB 368 at para 60) is
unsound. I reject it unequivocally. Credibility determi-
nations must be based on the totality of the evidence, not
untested assumptions of a victim’s likely behaviour
based on myths and stereotypes.
The judge properly looked at the evidence, as
opposed to myth and stereotypes, and accepted that the
complainant’s motivation for staying with the accused
after being raped on July 23, 2012, and not telling the
police, was to help him and to not further disrupt their
family situation. The fact that the complainant did not
tell the police that night about being raped was irrelevant
to assessing her credibility . . . . . The judge also accepted
the complainant’s evidence that she sincerely believed
that her children were not in danger and that, regardless
of the conflict between her and the accused, he could
continue to care for the children after the July 23, 2012
incident. There is nothing in the record to suggest other
than the accused was a good caregiver for the children;
particularly when the complainant was not around. I see
no palpable and overriding errors in the judge’s conclu-
sions as to the complainant’s credibility given the fact
that she did not sever all contact with the accused after
the July 23, 2012 incident. 
The next decision illustrates that stereotypical thinking can
also be improperly applied to the evidence of the accused. 
“[T]he law is
now well settled
that the use of
myths and
stereotypes has
no place in the
determination of
credibility.”
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The accused appealed from conviction.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.
It indicated that (at paragraph 25):
[T]he [accused’s] sexual orientation was not relevant
to the charges against him. It is settled law that with cer-
tain limited exceptions (where, for example the crime
involves deviant sexual behaviour or the accused himself
testifies to strong aversion to the sexual activity alleged,
making his own sexual tastes an issue), evidence of sex-
ual orientation is not probative of guilt and cannot be
used to draw an inference that the accused is more likely
to have committed the crime charged.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that the
trial judge permitted the accused “to be put” in an “unfair posi-
tion” and “it was unjust to judge the [accused] on the quality
of his responses” (at paragraphs 35-37):  
The reliance on the inadmissible evidence to assess
credibility in this case is problematic. The examination
of an accused on sexual orientation puts that person in
an unfair position. There may be many reasons unrelated
to guilt or innocence why a person may not wish to pub-
licly assert their sexual orientation. Those reasons may
be very strong in a small or religious community.
. . . .
Similarly, a gay man charged with sexually assaulting
a boy could properly harbour concerns that acknowl-
edging his homosexuality would be wrongly taken as an
acknowledgment of sexual attraction and could lead to
an improper inference that he is more likely to have
committed the crime charged. He could equally have
concerns that a negative answer could be viewed as
patently false. A negative answer might be viewed as an
obvious lie even, as in this case, in the absence of evi-
dence of its falsity, and as an attempt to avoid responsi-
bility. 
Finally, the most recent decision I wish to review illustrates
that the line between stereotypical thinking and assessing the
specific circumstances of a case can be a thin one and that it is
not always the prosecution suggesting we erred.  
R. v. ROBERTS
In R. v. Roberts, 2017 NWTCA 9 (Can.), the accused was
convicted of the offence of sexual assault. The evidence pre-
sented at the trial established that both the accused and the
complainant were under the influence of alcohol. The com-
plainant testified that she had gone to bed and was awoken by
the accused having sexual intercourse with her. The accused
testified that the complainant initiated multiple sexual
encounters with him, all of which were consensual. In con-
victing the accused, the trial judge stated: “On the accused’s
evidence, every aspect of the sexual encounter between the
accused and [the complainant] is instigated by [the com-
plainant]. While that is not impossible, it certainly seems
improbable.” 
The accused appealed from conviction. He argued that the
R. v. T.J.B.
In R. v. T.J.B., 2017 BCCA 49
(Can.), the accused was con-
victed of the offence of sexual
assault. The complainant was
ten years of age at the time. The
accused was twenty years of age.
During the cross-examination
of the accused, Crown counsel asked a number of questions
concerning the accused’s sexuality:
Q. So you consider yourself to be a heterosexual?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Have you ever talked with anyone about homo-
sexuality, interests in that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. How about with your friends, do you talk about
girls?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. And I am not trying to cast aspersions or anything, but
kind of—the sort of thing like you’re out with your
friends and you see a good looking girl you’d be kind
of she looks nice, make a comment kind of thing?
A. Yeah. Actually just on break.
Q. Okay. And have you had any girlfriends?
A. I’ve had relationships that haven’t lasted long.
Q. With women?
A. Yes.
Q. With any men?
A. No.
In convicting the accused, the trial judge made use of this
evidence in concluding that the accused’s testimony was not
believable (at paragraph 23):
[W]hen asked in cross-examination if he was gay, the
accused strongly denied that he was anything other than
heterosexual. When asked if he talked about girls, he
said “Oh yeah”. He commented that he had seen a good
looking girl during a break in the trial and he would
comment on this sighting to his friends. He testified that
he has had relationships with women, but they have not
lasted very long. I found the accused highly defensive of
his sexuality. He appeared to try too hard to convince the
Court that he was heterosexual. I found his responses to
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trial judge “made a stereotypical assumption about the implau-
sibility of the complainant initiating multiple sexual encoun-
ters which materially eroded the trial’s truth-seeking function
and unfairly compromised the fairness of the trial, rendering
the appellant’s conviction unsafe” (at paragraph 51). He argued
that “in rejecting” his “evidence that the complainant had ini-
tiated the sexual contact as ‘implausible’, the trial judge
resorted to myth-based assumptions and beliefs about how a
woman would sexually engage in this situation” (at paragraph
51).
The Court of Appeal of the North West Territories suggested
that it “may fairly be said that a bulk of judicial attention has
been expended on various types of stereotypical thinking,
assumptions or generalizations identified as being unfairly
applied to sexual assault complainants” (at paragraph 47).  
The Court of Appeal held that (at paragraph 62):
[T]he trial judge did not resort to impermissible
stereotypes or assumptions about how a complainant
would engage sexually in the circumstances of this case.
There is nothing in the trial judge’s decision that hints at
such a stereotype being considered or assessed, or any
such generalized assumption being made; and the appel-
lant’s reliance on one small portion of the decision con-
cerning implausibility is no evidence of such an error,
either in its own right or when necessarily considered in
the context of the entire decision.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the conviction was
“not based on a stereotypical generalized assumption about
sexual behavior” (at paragraphs 65 and 66):
In our view, the conclusion reached by the trial judge
was not based on a stereotypical generalized assumption
about sexual behaviour, but was grounded in and arose
directly from the evidence. Her conclusions were not
impermissibly anchored in some personal worldview
unrelated to the evidence, and did not find any genesis,
or provenance, in dangerously presumptive generaliza-
tions or assumptions about the normative behaviour of a
sexual assault complainant, or this particular sexual
assault complainant.
Rather, we conclude that this finding rested upon the
totality of the evidence the trial judge did accept: that in
the factual matrix of this case, this complainant, would
not have instigated multiple sexual encounters with the
appellant. In her reasons, this finding was directly tied to
the evidence of the complainant as to her distressed state
arising from an argument with her spouse and him leav-
ing with the children, as well as the testimony of DE and
MS – both of whom confirmed the complainant was
upset a short while before the sexual encounter took
place. It was also uncontradicted that the police had
attended at the residence earlier that night on a domes-
tic dispute call. The complainant further testified that
she had gone to bed after the police left and awoke to the
appellant having sexual intercourse with her; when she
told him to get off, he punched her in the head and
threatened her. She admitted she was intoxicated
throughout.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that in assessing the credibility of a
witness it can be “very difficult for a trial judge to articulate
with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that
emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempt-
ing to reconcile the various versions of events.”9 It has also
been suggested that it “is now acknowledged that demeanour
is of limited value because it can be affected by many factors
including the culture of the witness, stereotypical attitudes,
and the artificiality of and pressures associated with a court-
room.”10
Whatever one might think of these suggestions, it is clear
that the time when it was thought that “the ideal judicial voice
would have sounded something like the voice of God” is long
past.11
It is also clear that there is no place for trial judges to assess
credibility based upon assumptions as to how a true victim of
a sexual assault should act or behave.12
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provin-
cial Court Judges. He also writes a regular
column (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
9. R. v. Gagnon, 1 S.C.R. 621 (Can.), at paragraph 20.
10. R. v. Dyce, 2017 ONCA 123 (Can.), at paragraph 12.
11. Richard Posner, Judges Writing Styles (and do they matter?), 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (1995).
12. In R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 424 (Can.), the issue arose as a
result of comments made in an unrelated matter. In Richards, the
trial judge in a sentencing case held just before Mr. Richard’s trial
commenced, referred to addicts as being “liars, cheaters, and
thieves, every one.” The accused argued on appeal from convic-
tion that these comments gave rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias. In rejecting this argument, the Ontario Court of Appeal
held that (at paragraph 58):
[T]he impugned remarks, made in unrelated proceedings
after guilt had already been determined, is incapable of
demonstrating any sound basis for perceiving that any deci-
sion made at trial was grounded in prejudice, generalizations
or stereotypical reasoning. In coming to this conclusion, I in
no way condone the word choice employed by the trial judge
in the unrelated proceedings.
